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I.ABSTRACT

Although the growth of extradition treaties has assisted in the prosecution
of suspects who are not present in the state seeking their prosecution, there will
always be situations where extradition is not available or plausible. In such
circumstances the prosecuting state may be tempted to undertake an abduction
in order to facilitate the prosecution of the individual in their own jurisdiction.
The objective of this paper is to examine the use of state-sponsored abductions
in light of international human rights law. Although the United States Supreme
Court recently held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that an extraterritorial abduction
does not violate the rights of individuals under international law, it is evident
that this judgment misread the content of customary international law.
Individuals have the right to be free from extraterritorial abduction and despite
the Supreme Court's decision, recognition of this right is necessary to ensure
that the fate of abductees is not entirely dependant upon whether states are
willing to advance claims on their behalf.
II.INTRODUCTION

The issue of extraterritorial abductions is fraught with important policy and
legal considerations. While there may be a pressing need to achieve justice by
interrogating or prosecuting a suspect, efforts to secure custody may compromise the rights of the individual and those of the state where the individual
resides (the host-state). This paper acknowledges that in the absence of consent
by the host-state an extraterritorial abduction, or rendition, breaches international law by violating the sovereignty of the state. However, it is contended
that an examination of the issues surrounding extraterritorial abductions is not
limited to the confines of state sovereignty and it is therefore important that a
human rights dimension is added to the analysis. This paper will argue that
state-sponsored abductions violate an individual's right to be free from
extraterritorial abduction and that this right exists independently of whether
there is also a breach of a state's territorial integrity.
Such a right for individuals to be free from extraterritorial abduction was
not acknowledged in the recent case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.' The United
States Supreme Court had to consider whether abductees could bring a civil
claim under the Alien Tort Statute alleging a violation of the "law of nations." 2
While the Court held that Alvarez had no cause of action, the approach of the
Supreme Court to customary international law regarding abductions was flawed,
and the decision was substantially influenced by the current war on terrorism.

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
28 U.S.C. § 1350(2000).
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Although the Supreme Court's decision not to bar all future suits alleging
violations of international law will be declared a victory by human rights
advocates, there is a risk that the aspect of the decision relating to extraterritorial
abductions may be overlooked. It is important that the Court's decision is not
recognized as an accurate appraisal of customary international law and that
domestic courts throughout the world endeavour to protect the rights of
abductees.
Section II of this paper will outline the international law regulating
extraterritorial abduction and the importance of recognizing individual rights
within this state-centric analysis. Section II will discuss the decision of the
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and will illustrate that the Court's
determination of the role of the Alien Tort Statute affected the analysis of
customary international law. This decision is further criticized in section IV,
which demonstrates that individuals have a customary international law right to
be free from extraterritorial abduction and that the Supreme Court's examination of this norm was inadequate. This section will also demonstrate that
although individuals have the right not to be abducted by states, as yet there is
no corresponding international right requiring states to refrain from prosecuting
those seized in violation of their rights. Finally, section v. will conclude that the
Supreme Court's analysis of customary international law cannot be reconciled
with state practice and will outline how the political climate and ideological
predispositions could have influenced the Court's misreading of the content of
customary international law.
It is only by recognizing the right of individuals to be free from extraterritorial abduction that international law will be able to protect individuals in
circumstances where the host-state is complicit in the abduction or is unwilling
to protest the abduction. International law has traditionally been ineffective in
such situations as individuals have not been acknowledged as actors in
international law and the abduction is subsequently only viewed as a violating
the rights of the state. Widespread recognition of the right of individuals not to
be subjected to state-sponsored abductions is therefore an important
development and is consistent with the growth of international human rights law
which ensures that individuals are no longer completely dependant on states to
advance claims on their behalf.

III. EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION: THE TRADITIONAL FRAILTIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The term "extraterritorial abduction" refers to the situation when a state
seeking the custody of a suspected criminal forcibly removes that individual
from a foreign country in order to facilitate criminal prosecution. States are
encouraged into undertaking extraterritorial measures by the fact that in many
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jurisdictions the mere physical presence of a suspect is sufficient for a court to
exercise jurisdiction without an inquiry into how the individual was detained.3
It is a fundamental principle of international law that states must not
perform "acts of sovereignty" within the territory of another state.4 There is
consequently widespread recognition that extraterritorial abductions breach
international law by violating the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
host-state.5 A breach of international law constitutes an international wrong, for
which the state in question has a responsibility to remedy.6 For individuals who
have been abducted, the key issue is whether the remedy for the breach of
international law mandates that they be repatriated.
The traditional view of international law is that the rights of the individual
are irrelevant to the issue of whether the abductee will be prosecuted by the
abducting state or returned to the aggrieved state. Traditionally, the only aspect
of extraterritorial abduction that invokes state responsibility is the violation of
sovereignty, the remedy for which has typically been left to the vagaries on
international diplomacy.7 While the host-state may demand the return of an
abductee as a remedy for the violation of its sovereignty, making an individual
reliant upon the initiatives taken by the host-state not only leads to inconsistency
in the treatment of abductees but also unsatisfactorily relegates the importance
of international human rights law. Focusing on the claim of the "injured" state
ignores the possibility that an individual may possess a right under international
law that has been breached independently from that of a state.
While a state may bring an international claim based on the breach of its
sovereignty, the law of diplomatic protection provides a means for a state to
protest the treatment of its nationals. A state may bring a claim against another
3.

M. CHERIF BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADTON: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 253

(2002).
4.
L OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 295 (8th ed. 1955). See also Case of the SS
"Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 1, 18-19 (June 27); Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 111 (June 27).
5.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987); OPPENHEIM, supra note 4; BASSIOUNI, supra note 3.; Paul Mitchell, English-Speaking Justice:
Evolving Responses to TransnationalForcibleAbductionAfterAlvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383,
410 (1996); Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction Over Persons Abducted in Violation of
InternationalLaw in the Aftermath of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 5 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 205, 240
(1998); Alberto Costi, Problems with Current International and National Practices Concerning
ExtraterritorialAbductions,8 N.Z. ASS'N COMP. L. Y.B. 57, 61 (2002); Silvia Borelli, TerrorismandHuman
Rights: Treatmentof TerroristSuspects andLimits on InternationalCo-operation,16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L., 803,
805 (2003)
6.

International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, Draft Articles on

Responsibilityof Statesfor InternationallyWrongful Acts, art. 28, U.N. Doc A/56/1 0 (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts]; SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR
ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 501 (Longmans Publishing, London 1992).

7.

Mitchell, supra note 5, at 437.
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state based on diplomatic protection when its citizens have been unable to
obtain satisfaction for injuries caused by a state's breach of international law.8
While such an approach minimises the failings of the international legal system
to recognize the rights of an abductee, it is a misconception to view diplomatic
protection as an effective means to vindicate the individual's rights. Although
a precondition of diplomatic protection is that an individual is harmed by the act
of a state, such an injury is viewed as an injury to the individual's state of
nationality rather than to the individual.9 So the claim is transformed into an
inter-state matter and the state is seeking redress for the injury caused to itself
rather than to the individual.'I As is the case for inter-state claims based on a
violation of sovereignty, an act of diplomatic protection is not a private right so
individuals are entirely dependant on their national state to espouse their
claim."
Recourse to diplomatic protection in cases of extraterritorial abduction has
been relegated in importance due to the development of modern human rights
laws. Since World War II this movement has not only facilitated a growing
recognition of human rights, but also led to the acceptance that many of these
rights are not simply derived from the rights of a state.' 2 Individuals are
increasingly viewed as distinct actors in international law, and an infringement
of their rights by a state may give rise to a claim being brought before an international organization 3 or provide the basis for a civil suit. The acknowledgment that the rights of individuals are not necessarily fused with those of
the state is important in the field of extraterritorial abductions as it allows an
individual to challenge his/her abduction regardless of whether a state also
protests the abduction. Furthermore, it means that international law may be able
to provide a remedy to individuals who are abducted and removed from the
country with the collusion of the host-state.
In the absence of recognition of independent human rights, international
law has traditionally been unable to protect an abductee where connivance on
the part of the host-state means that there is no violation of the sovereignty of

8.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U. K.) 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 at 5, 6 (Aug.
30), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1924.08.30_mavrommatis/.(ast visited
9/30/05).
9.
10.

C. F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (1990).
CUTHBERT JOSEPH, NATIONALITY AND DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION: THE COMMONWEALTH OF

NATIONS 1 (1969).
11.
AMERASINGHE, supra note 9, at 60.
12.
Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and
UnaddressedHuman Rights Claims, 67 ST JOHN'S L. REv. 551, 555 (1993).
13.
For example, accession to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights allows individuals to bring claims against that particular state before the United Nations
Human Rights Committee.
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the state, or where the host-state is unwilling to advance a claim. 4 However,
as this paper will demonstrate, these frailties of the international legal system
have, to an extent, been rectified by the development of an international norm
providing individuals with the right not to be subjected to extraterritorial
abduction.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN

A. Background
1. The CriminalProceedings
In 1985 a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent working in
Mexico was kidnapped and tortured over two days before being murdered. A
grand jury in the Central District of California issued a warrant in 1990 for the
arrest of Alvarez, a doctor, who was alleged to have been involved in
prolonging the life of the agent for the purpose of interrogation. After Mexico
refused to extradite Alvarez, the DEA approved a plan to abduct him in order
to bring him to the United States to face charges. The DEA hired Mexican
nationals, including Sosa, to abduct Alvarez and detain him overnight before he
5
was flown back to the United States where DEA officials arrested him.'
Following Mexico's protestation of the violation of its sovereignty, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in 1991 that the abduction
violated principles of international law protecting the territorial integrity of a
state as well as the extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States. 6
Consequently, the Court ruled that the appropriate remedy was to dismiss the
proceedings and for Alvarez to be returned to Mexico. 17 However, the Supreme
Court subsequently reversed this unanimous decision by the Court of Appeals.
Adhering to an earlier decision in United States v. Rauscher that a defendant
may not be prosecuted in violation of an extradition treaty," the focus of the
Court was on whether the United States-Mexico extradition treaty was breached
by Alvarez's abduction. Chief Justice Rehnquist for the majority determined
that the extradition treaty was only intended to provide a mechanism for
obtaining the custody of an individual in specific circumstances and was never
intended to stipulate the only means by which a state could gain custody of an
individual."
After concluding that the treaty did not expressly prohibit
abductions, the majority held that general principles of international law
14.
15.

BASsIOUNI, supra note 3, at 256.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2746.

16.

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991).

17.

Id.

18.
19.

United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992).
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provided no basis for inferring an implied term into the treaty precluding the use
of state-sponsored abductions.20
Just as controversial as the Court's meager analysis of international law
was the dismissal of the relevance of international law, with the Court declaring
it a matter for the Executive to take into consideration. 21 As well as a scathing
dissent from Justice Stevens, that labeled the decision as showing a "shocking
disdain" for international law, the decision received near universal criticism
from academics.22 However, while the Supreme Court settled the issue of
jurisdiction over Alvarez, he was acquitted in his subsequent trial, with the trial
judge noting that the case against him involved the "wildest speculation. 23
After having indicated in 1992 that Alvarez's abduction could give rise to
a civil remedy,24 the Supreme Court was given another opportunity to consider
the facts of the Alvarez case in 2004 when Alvarez filed claims against those
involved in his abduction. Alvarez brought a claim against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and a suit against Sosa and other
2
Mexicans involved in his abduction under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 1
2. The Civil Proceedings
a. The FTCA
Alvarez's FTCA suit against the United States Government was based on
the assertion that the DEA had no authority to arrest Alvarez in Mexico and that
the Government was accordingly liable for his false arrest. While the FTCA
was intended to make the Government as liable for tortious actions as an
individual,2 6 it provides the Government with immunity for "any claim arising
'
in a foreign country."27
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals and held that this exception applied even when tortious acts in
foreign states were planned within the United States. 8 Consequently the United
States Government had immunity against Alvarez's claim.
20.
Id at 668-69.
21.
Id. at 669.
22.
See, e.g. Mitchell, supra note 5; Paust, supra note 12; Wilske, supra note 5; Kristin Berdan
Weissman, ExtraterritorialAbduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459
(1994); Andrew L. Strauss, A GlobalParadigmShattered: The JurisdictionalNihilism of the Supreme Court's
Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain,67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994).

23.
24.
25.

Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 331 F.3d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 2003).
Alvarez-Machain,504 U.S. at 669.
The Alien Tort Statute is also commonly referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §

1350 (2000).
26.
Mark Dean, Smith v. United States: Justice Denied Under the FTCA 'Foreign Country'
Exception, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553 (1993).

27.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000).

28.

Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2753.
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b. TheATS

This paper focuses on the Supreme Court's treatment of Alvarez's claim
under the ATS. The ATS provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 29
The issue for the courts to determine would appear, on the reading of this
statute, to be whether the individuals who abducted Alvarez violated the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States. However, rather than closely examining
the relevant facts, the court cases became a debate on the role of the ATS under
federal law.
The ATS is contentious because of its potentially wide use and political
implications. The ATS was enacted in 1789, but remained largely unused for
the most part of two centuries. ° However, it was revitalized by the U.S. Court
3" In that case the
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartigav. Pena-Irala.
Court held that a Paraguayan national could sue a former Paraguayan official
in the United States for acts of torture committed in Paraguay. The Court held
that the prohibition against torture was a specific, universal and obligatory
international norm, and consequently there was a breach of the law of nations.32
The view that the ATS could provide a forum for redressing any tortious
violations of the law of nations regardless of the nationality of the defendant or
the place of the violation prompted a flurry of human rights litigation in the
United States. 3' However, some courts in the United States have failed to
endorse the approach established in Filartiga,34 with many commentators also
concerned about the effects that widespread ATS litigation could have on the
foreign relations of the United States. 5

29.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).

30.

Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez Machain: What Piracy Teaches About the

Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 111 (2004).
31.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irsla, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
32.
Id. at 878.
33.
Cases that have been brought by foreigners under the ATS include alleging summary execution,
arbitrary detention, causing disappearance, genocide, war crimes, forced labour and violation ofenvironmental
standards. Kontorvich, supra note 30, at 8.
34. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
35.
See, e.g., Covey T. Oliver, Problems of Cognition andInterpretation in Applying Norms and
Customary InternationalLaw of Human Rights in the United States Courts, 4 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 59 (1981);
Charles F. Marshall, Re-framing the Alien Tort Act after Kadic v. Karadzic, 21 N.C.J. INT'L. & COM. REG.
591 (1996); Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1
(1994); Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs ofInternationalHuman Rights Litigation,2 Cm. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001);
Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, InternationalImplicationsof the Alien Tort Statute, J. INT'L

ECON. L. 245 (2004).
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain therefore, provided the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to determine whether the recent revival of the ATS can be justified
as consistent with the intentions of the drafters in 1789. It is readily apparent
that to allow suits to be brought for any breach of international law would make
the court system unworkable and could involve United States courts
determining matters of international law that may have no relevance to the
United States. To limit this apparently open-ended jurisdiction, courts have
read in a requirement that the aspect of international law invoked by a plaintiff
must be a "well-established, universally recognized norm."36 The universal
nature of the norm would therefore provide a sufficient link for United States
courts to take an interest in providing a forum to hear claims based on the most
serious violations of international law. Although the ATS recognizes violations
of the "law of nations or a treaty of the United States," by requiring the rule to
have universal acceptance courts have effectively limited the scope of the ATS
as only applying to breaches of customary international law.37
Despite this judicial limitation on the applicability of the ATS, there are
still concerns as to whether the Filartigaline of cases is accurate in concluding
that the ATS creates a private right of action for individuals. Academic
commentary on the role of the ATS appears to be evenly divided into two broad
camps: those who believe that the ATS provides subject-matter jurisdiction for
breaches of universally recognized norms of international law,3" and those who
believe that the ATS merely confers procedural jurisdiction on federal courts to
hear claims but does not create a cause of action for individuals.39 This latter
viewpoint would severely limit the success of future ATS suits, as it would
require plaintiffs to show that a particular norm in international law explicitly
provides for a civil remedy.'
36.
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878; In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation v.
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F .2d 691 (2d Cir. 1992).
37.
Jason Jarvis, A New Paradigmfor the Alien Tort Statute under Extraterritorialityand the
UniversalityPrinciple,30 PEPP. L. REV.671,674 (2003); see also Julian G. Ku, CustomaryInternationalLaw
in State Courts, 42 VA. J.INT'L L. 265, 271 (2001).
38.
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman and Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga'sFirm Footing:InternationalHuman
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Harvard Law Review Ass'n,
International CriminalLaw: Corporate Liabilityfor Violations of InternationalHuman Rights Law, 114
HARv. L. REV. 2025 (2001); Justin Lu, Jurisdictionover Non-State Activity under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531 (1997); Armin Rosencranz and Richard Campbell, ForeignEnvironmental
and Human Rights Suits Against US Corporationsin US. Courts, 18 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 145 (1999).
39.
See, e.g., William R Casto, The FederalCourts' ProtectiveJurisdictionover Torts Committed
in Violation of the Law ofNations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); William D'Zurilla Individual Responsibility
for Torture underInternationalLaw, 56 TutL. L. REV. 186 (1981); Marshall, supra note 35; Jarvis, supra note
37.
40.
GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 421 (1988).
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It was against this background of contention as to the appropriate function
of the ATS that Alvarez brought his claim. Indeed, as it transpired, the majority
of submissions, and indeed all the amici curiaebriefs, focused on the role of the
ATS in federal law rather than examining whether Alvarez's extraterritorial
abduction was prohibited by customary international law.
B. Decision of the U.S. Court ofAppealsfor the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit in Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa affirmed the Filartiga

position that the ATS granted courts jurisdiction to hear claims for breaches of
international norms that were "specific, universal, and obligatory."4' 1 However,
the Court found it unnecessary to examine whether there was an international
norm prohibiting states from abducting individuals in violation of another
state's sovereignty as "the right of a nation to invoke its territorial integrity does
not translate into the right of an individual to invoke such interests in the name
of the law of nations."4' 2 The Court was correct in its view that Alvarez did not
have standing to bring his claim solely on the violation of Mexican sovereignty.
Although there was a breach of customary international law, to allow a lawsuit
to be successful on this basis would mean that any individual of the wronged
state would be able to bring a civil claim. The primary aim of the law of torts
is to return an injured individual to their position prior to the alleged wrongful
act,4 3 but in this case the harm was caused to Mexico and granting damages to
Alvarez would not vindicate this harm.
Although Alvarez could not assert a claim for damages based on the breach
of Mexican sovereignty he did have valid arguments for claiming that his
extraterritorial abduction breached customary international law, and that
damages should accordingly be awarded under the ATS. This claim is based on
his individual rights, rather than the claim associated with Mexican sovereignty.
However, like the Supreme Court to follow, the Court of Appeals refuted this
claim, stating, "our review of the international authorities and literature reveals
no specific binding obligation, express or implied, on the part of the United
States or its agents to refrain from trans-border kidnapping." This aspect of
the decision will be discussed further under the analysis of the Supreme Court
decision.
However, the Court also held that although there was no international
prohibition against extraterritorial abduction, there was a clear and universally
41.

Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612.

42.

Id.
at 617.

43.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 5-6 (5th ed. 1984); W. V. H. ROGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 2-3 (11th ed.

1979).
44.

Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 619.
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recognized norm against arbitrary arrest and detention.4 5 Indicating that the
DEA lacked authorization for extraterritorial law enforcement, the Court held
that Alvarez was arbitrarily detained from the time he was kidnapped until he
was handed over to authorities in the United States. 46 With the en banc Court
split 6-4, Sosa appealed to the Supreme Court.

C. Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in a
judgment designed to re-fashion future litigation under the ATS. The Supreme
Court agreed with Sosa's submissions that it is "frivolous" and "implausible"
to believe that the ATS authorizes the creation of causes of action for torts in
violation of international law.47 However, the Court then back-tracked from its
determination that the ATS is only jurisdictional in nature by recognizing that
when the statute was created in 1789 Congress would have intended claims to
be able to heard for a narrow set of international law violations. 4' The Court
adhered to the view of Sir William Blackstone in Commentaries on the Laws of
England that as of 1789 only international law norms prohibiting the violation
of safe conduct, the infringement of the rights of ambassadors and piracy were
part of the common law. 49 Accordingly, the Court determined that the ATS can
permit suits based on a "modest" number of international law violations."0
Justice Souter for the majority indicated that to provide the basis for an
ATS suit, not only must an international norm be "specific, universal, and
obligatory,"'" but that "federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted."52
Beyond the need for specificity and universal acceptance of the norm, the
Court did not establish any other conditions for when an international norm
would be considered analogous to the stated eighteenth century offences. This
was because Alvarez's suit was dismissed as not invoking a precise enough

45. Id. at 621.
46. Id. at 626.
47. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2755.
48. Id. at 2756.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2761.
51.
Id. at 2766. In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the approach of the majority as encouraging
uncertainty as the requirement that a norm be "specific, universal, and obligatory" was exactly the same test
that led the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to reach a contrary conclusion concerning Alvarez's abduction.
Id. at 2775 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2744.
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norm to found an ATS claim.5 3 However, the Court did stress for the purposes
of future cases that "this requirement of clear definition is not meant to be the
only principle limiting the availability of relief in federal courts 5for
violations
4
of customary international law, although it disposes of this case.
While the majority limited the scope of future ATS claims, the decision not
to rule out future claims under the ATS was vehemently criticized by the
dissenting judges. Justice Scalia denounced the majority's treatment of the ATS
as a usurpation of Congress' lawmaking authority and lamented that "this Court
seems incapable of admitting that some matters-any matters-are none of its
business."55 The dissent stressed that the "law of nations" was originally
understood to refer to the regulation of state-to-state practices, and that any
redefinition of the term to restrain a state's activities towards individuals is an
"invention" by academics and human rights advocates.56 Such an approach pays
scant regard to the importance that human rights now have in international law,
and as this paper will make evident later, the notion that international law
should be viewed as a static concept at a point in time in the eighteenth century
is motivated by ideological convictions. International law is a mobile concept
and its development is dependant on the recognition of shifting state practice.
It is regrettable that the Supreme Court, and especially the dissenting judges, felt
constrained to strictly interpret the reference to the "law of nations" in the
circumstances when the ATS was originally enacted.
Alvarez's arguments before the Supreme Court were based on the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that his abduction constituted an arbitrary
arrest and detention as it was conducted without lawful authority.57

The

Supreme Court did not find it necessary to examine whether the DEA had the
authority to sanction an extraterritorial arrest, holding that "Alvarez cites little
authority that a rule so broad [as prohibiting arbitrary detention] has the status
of a binding customary norm today."" This paper will not only show that
Alvarez was hindered by the decision that his extraterritorial abduction should
be analyzed in light of the more general right to be free from arbitrary detention,
but that the Court's analysis of international law was inadequate and failed to
recognize the existence of an individual right to be free from state-sponsored
abduction.
After indicating that customary international law did not prohibit Alvarez's
abduction and subsequent detention, the Court concluded that "It is enough to
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id at 2769.
Id at 2766.
Id. at 2776 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Brief of Respondent, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339) [hereinafter

Brief of Respondent].

58.

Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2768.
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hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer
of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a
federal remedy." "
Such a conclusion would appear to indicate that the Court was not
examining the content of customary international law from the same perspective
as judges and academics around the world. Rather, it was examining whether
there is a customary international norm specific enough to provide the basis of
a suit in domestic law. However, while the Court could simply dismiss a case
by holding that the alleged norm is not specific enough to found a suit under the
ATS, such an approach presupposes the existence of the norm at the
international level. The first determination of the Court has to be whether the
norm exists under customary international law, and, if it does, the Court then
has to examine whether it is specific enough to be incorporated into law under
the ATS.6 ' The Supreme Court implicitly accepted such an approach by noting
that the alleged norm prohibiting arbitrary detention was much too broad to
have the status of binding customary law, 6' but that in any event it was also too
broad to allow for a suit under the ATS. 62
This paper does not challenge the determination that the alleged norm
should not be actionable under United States federal law. Rather, it is
contended that the Court erred in its conclusion that customary international law
is not invoked by the abduction and detention of Alvarez. The implications of
the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain may not be limited
to restricting the possibility of future abductees being able to claim damages
under the ATS. By concluding that there was no customary international law
prohibition against the forcible abduction and detention of individuals the Court
may also have limited the potential for individuals to have criminal proceedings
dismissed based a violation of their rights.

59.

Id.at 2769.

60.
Kontorovich concurs with such an approach, indicating that a Court must first determine whether
an alleged norm has the required recognition to be part of the law of nations, before moving on to consider
whether it can be said to be part of a narrower subset of being defined with a specificity comparable to
eighteenth century offences. Kontorvich, supra note 30 at 13, 26.
61.

Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2744.

62.

Id.at 2745.
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V. Is THERE AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM
EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION?

A. What Human Right Should be Analyzed?
As the Court of Appeals determined that there is no international norm
prohibiting extraterritorial abduction, Alvarez did not pursue this argument
before the Supreme Court. Rather, it was argued that his abduction nevertheless
violated a prohibition on arbitrary detention. The Supreme Court was therefore
only tasked with determining whether there is international recognition of the
prohibition of arbitrary detention. It did not examine the trans-border nature of
his abduction.63 Such an approach is flawed.
It is artificial to completely separate the analysis of the issues, as the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain did. The
question should not be whether international law provides a general right to be
free from arbitrary detention, but whether evidence of this general right may
demonstrate the existence of a more specific right to be free from extraterritorial
abduction. By only focusing on the alleged right to be free from arbitrary
detention the Supreme Court was able to highlight the high degree of generality
of conduct that any such right would have to prohibit: ranging from
unauthorized and unlawful arrests by police officers 64 to a temporary detention
by officers who overstep their authority.65 Due to an inability to prove that there
was uniform international practice regarding all these scenarios, the Court was
able to dismiss the alleged right to be free from arbitrary detention, without even
having to consider the transnational nature of the detention.
By only considering the duration of Alvarez's detention and not taking into
account the fact that he was forcibly removed from Mexico to the United States,
the Supreme Court's approach fails to take into account the very feature of
extraterritorial abductions that makes them scandalous. The Court is effectively
treating a transnational abductee in the same manner it would any other
individual who had been detained unlawfully by a state. However, where an
individual is unlawfully detained by a state within its borders for the purpose of
initiating criminal proceedings, there are often many due process rights that
domestic courts can invoke to censure the Executive and vindicate the breach
of the individual's rights. But where an individual is detained on foreign soil
and transferred to another country to face trial, courts have been all too willing
to hold that the procedural protections afforded by domestic law do not apply

63.
64.
65.

Id.at 2767.
Id. at 2768.
Id. at 2769.
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if the individual is not in the country.6 In the absence of such procedural
protections it is important that courts considering the human rights of
individuals are able to take into account the fact that the individual has been
forcibly removed from another state in order to face prosecution.
While the Court of Appeals dismissed Alvarez's claim that there is an
individual right prohibiting extraterritorial abduction, it did so on the basis that
the United States had no obligation to refrain from abducting an individual.6 7
It was evident that the Court considered itselfbound by the 1992 Supreme Court
decision that Alvarez's abduction was not explicitly prohibited by the United
States-Mexico Extradition Treaty. Such a state-centric approach only upholds
individual rights to the extent that they do not restrict the actions of states. As
the Supreme Court focused solely on the possible existence of a right to be free
from arbitrary detention, the issue of whether individuals have a right to be free
from extraterritorial abductions was never satisfactorily examined by either
Court.
B. Determining the Content of Customary InternationalLaw

International law recognizes that state sovereignty is the basis of inter-state
relations, and tries to create a framework where states are only bound by what
they consent to. However, over time it is possible for state practice to create a
legally binding rule in the form of customary international law.6" Unlike
treaties, which are only binding on parties to them, customary international law,
once established, is universally binding.69 Customary international law will
emerge if there is consistent state practice coupled with opiniojuris,a belief that
such conduct is legally required.7"
66.
For a good analysis of the issues surrounding the extraterritorial effect of domestic rights see
Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalizationof US Law Enforcement: Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 HOUS.
L. R. 307 (2002). Bassiouni notes that while the United States Constitution applies extraterritorially in respect
to the conduct of the United States towards its citizens, the law is not settled as to the extent that the
Constitution applies to conduct by the United States towards an alien in a foreign country. BASsIOUNI, supra
note 3, at 280-85. See also Paust, supra note 12; Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transferin the War Against

Terrorism: Guantanamoand Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 457; Timothy D. Rudy, Did We
Treaty Away Ker-Frisbie?,26 ST. MARY'S L. J. 791 (1995).
67.
Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 617.
68.
See Ernest Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over CustomaryInternationalLaw, 42 VA. J. INT'L
L. 365 (2002), for a good review of critiques on the compatibility of customary international law with

traditional consent-based international law.
69. Although as will be discussed, a persistent objector to a customary rule while it is being
formulated is not bound by the application of the rule.
70.
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INTERNATIONAL LAw, (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf. (last visited
9/30/05) [hereinafter ILA].
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The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has indicated that the state practice
giving rise to customary international law must be "settled.", 71 While the degree
of uniformity of the practice must be extensive there is no need for complete
consistency before norms become binding. 2 However, there is provision for
states to be exempt from being bound by customary international law if they can
be said to have been a persistent objector to a customary rule while it was being
developed.73
Although states may act in a uniform manner on an issue, there must also
be evidence that such conduct occurred because it corresponded with a legal
obligation or a legal right.7 4 This opinio juris requirement of customary
international law can often be inferred from state practice, or may be proven by
official statements or treaty-based law. While the obligations imposed on states
by their accession to treaties will not necessarily crystallize into customary
international law, this may occur if there is widespread participation and the
treaty is of a norm-creating character. 75 As the International Law Association
stated, the creation of customary international law through multilateral treaties
occurs because:
[P]arties to the treaty, in relation to nonparties, or non-parties in
relation to parties or between themselves, adopt a practice in line with
that prescribed (or authorized) by the treaty, but which is in fact
independent of it because of the general rule that treaties neither bind
nor benefit third parties. 76
The right to be free from extraterritorial abduction, as evidenced through
a prohibition against arbitrary detention, satisfies these requirements of
customary international law. The Supreme Court's analysis in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain of the effect that international instruments have on the formation of
customary international law was superficial and led the Court to erroneously
conclude that customary international law does not protect an individual from
extraterritorial abduction. Rather than simply focusing on the general protection
from arbitrary detention, it is arguable that the United Nations Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights
have cumulatively shaped state practice regarding the right of individuals not
to be subjected to state-sponsored abductions.
71.

North Sea Continental Shelf (F. R. G. v. Den.; F. R. G. v. Neth.) 1969 LC.J. Rep. 3 para. 60-82.

72.

Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 95-99; ILA, supra note 70, at 25.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Fisheries Case (U.IC v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18, 1951); ILA, supranote 70, at 27.
ILA, supra note 70, at 32.
North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 71, para. 72-73.
ILA, supra note 70, at 46.
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C. InternationalHuman Rights Law
1. The UnitedNations Framework
Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter requires states to refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. The
UN Security Council has interpreted this obligation to include state-sanctioned
abductions without the permission of the state where the abductee resides. After
Israel abducted former Nazi Adolph Eichmann from Argentina, the Security
Council condemned the action as a violation of Argentina's sovereignty." Such

a prohibition only relates to a violation of state sovereignty and is not applicable
where the host-state colludes with the abducting state. Furthermore, the Charter
may be seen as only regulating inter-state conduct and therefore not providing
individuals with any independent rights.7

However, the international law prohibition on violating state sovereignty
through the use extraterritorial abduction is relevant to the issue of whether
individuals possess an international right to be free from abductions. In many
cases the international denunciation of abductions also extends to the fact that
states have had to resort to extra-legal means to obtain custody of suspected
criminals.79 Consistent state practice of refraining from conducting extraterritorial abductions may be due to the norm protecting a state's territorial
integrity, but such practice can also be used to found a norm protecting the
rights of an individual in such situations. However, proving that states refrain
from forcible abductions because of a concern for human rights remains an
important impediment to proving the existence of an individual right to be free
from transnational abductions.
One of the purposes of the UN is to promote and encourage respect for
"fundamental freedoms" 80 and to this end the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights8 ' was adopted by the General Assembly to establish non-binding
principles relating to human rights and individual freedoms. At the time it was
not viewed as imposing legal obligations, but constant reaffirmation by the
General Assembly, universal acceptance by states, and wide-ranging reference
to the Declaration in numerous international and national instruments, has meant
that many of its standards have become binding customary international law.82
77.

See generally S.C. Res. 138, U.N. Doec.
S/RES/4349 (June 23, 1960).

78.
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The 'Federal Analogy' and U.N. Charter Interpretation: A Crucial
Issue, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1997).

79.

Costi, supra note 5, at 68.

80.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
81.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.217A, at 71, art. 8, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Istplen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
82.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATiONS LAw § 701. After a thorough analysis of
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Although some academics believe that the Declaration in its entirety represents
customary international law,8 3 for the purposes of this paper it is only necessary
to examine the contribution that specific rights contained in the Declaration
have had towards a customary international norm prohibiting extraterritorial
abduction.
Article 3 ofthe Universal Declaration provides that "everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person," while article 9 more specifically states,
"no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." The United
States submitted to the ICJ in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran 4 (The Hostages Case) that not only did every state
have an obligation to observe the Universal Declaration, but that articles 3 and
9 were fundamental rights to which all individuals were entitled.85 The Court
agreed, concluding that "wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom
and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself
manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights."86 Given the substantial contribution that the
Declaration has had in the creation of customary international human rights law,
it is very significant that the ICJ indicated that individuals have a basic right not
to be arbitrarily detained. The recognition that such a right is consistent with
the framework of the UN may help to show that the opinio juris for any
customary norm prohibiting extraterritorial abduction can be found through the
desire of states to uphold human rights and to act consistently with the
principles of the UN.
In light of the link provided by the ICJ between human rights and the UN
Charter it is implausible that the prohibition of arbitrary detention would not
include situations when an individual is forcibly abducted from another state.
As a transnational abduction violates not only the rights of the individual, but
also the territorial sovereignty of a state, such abductions would undermine the
state practice the International Law Association declared in 1994 that "many if not all of the rights elaborated
in the . . . Declaration . . . are widely recognized as constituting rules of customary international law."
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE, BUENOS AIRES (1994).

83.

As declared by the MontrealStatementfor the Assembly for Human Rights, Mar. 22-27, 1968,

reprinted in 9 I.C.J. REv., June 1969; Professor Humphrey has declared that the Declaration represents

customary international law and is "the universally accepted interpretation and definition of the human rights
left undefined by the Charter." John Humphrey, The InternationalBill ofRights: Scope and Implementation
17 W.M. & MARY L. REV. 527, 529 (1976); Professor Sohn also held that the Declaration had become a
universally binding instrument. Louis B Sohn, The Human Rights Law ofthe Charter, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 129,

133 (1977).
84.

Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U. S. v. Iran) 1980

I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
85.
86.

Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 182 (Jan. 12).
Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 91.
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founding principles of the UN. Despite these indications of how the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights would inform the content of customary
international law, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain did not
conduct any such analysis. After noting that the Declaration does not by itself
impose any obligations under international law,87 the Court failed to adequately
examine the role that the Declaration has played in establishing human rights
norms, and particularly the evidence that the right to be free from arbitrary
detention under the Declaration has crystallized into customary international
law. The neglect of the Declaration and the principles underpinning the UN
Charter illustrate the extent to which the Court's analysis of customary
international law was result-orientated.
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR provides that "[e]veryone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and
in accordance with such procedure as are established by law." 88
Analysis of this right not to be subjected to arbitrary detention must answer
two questions: does it provide an individual with the right to be free from extraterritorial abduction? And if so, what is the status of this right in international
law?
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is tasked with
hearing ICCPR claims under the Optional Protocol, has had several opportunities to examine the relationship between Article 9(1) and state-sponsored
abductions. In Celibertide Casariegov. Uruguay,89 a claim was brought to the
Committee on behalf of a Uruguayan national who had been detained by
Uruguayan officials in Brazil and forcibly removed to Uruguay where she was
charged with offences against that state. The Committee upheld the claim,
concluding that the "act of abduction into Uruguayan territory" constituted an
arbitrary arrest and detention." Importantly the Committee noted that simply
because a state party is not acting within its borders will not preclude the
application of the Covenant. 9 The Committee reached similar conclusions in
the cases of Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay92 and Almeida de Quinteros v.
87.

Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2767.

88.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter I.C.C.P.R.].
89.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Commc'n No.
56/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) [hereinafter Celiberti de Carariego].
90.
91.
92.

Id. para. 11.
Id. para. 10.1.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 52/1979,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (1981).
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Uruguay.93 The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has
even examined the facts of Alvarez's treatment and held that the abduction of
Alvarez was contrary to international law as well as in violation of Article 9(1)
of the Covenant. 94
These decisions indicate that the Human Rights Committee has taken a
very strong position in favor of protecting the rights of abductees. As
commentator Paul Mitchell notes, "the Committee reinforced the customary
international law rule prohibiting forcible abduction and transplanted the rule
into the human rights context, protecting individuals qua individuals." 95
However, the decisions go further than simply recognizing the right of
individuals to be free from forcible state-sponsored abductions. They also did
not consider it relevant to examine whether the host-states had consented to the
rendition of the individuals. Indeed in Giry v. DominicanRepublic96 and Canon
Garciav. Ecuador97 the Committee held that even in situations where the hoststate agrees to the irregular rendition of an individual rather than extradition, the
abduction of an individual would constitute arbitrary arrest and detention. This
is a dramatic departure away from the traditional position under international
law whereby consent or collusion on the part of the host-state would mean that
there was no breach of the state's sovereignty and consequently no possible
remedy for the individual. Rather, it recognizes a right of the individual,
regardless of a violation of the state's sovereignty.
The ICJ has indicated that the ability of states to make reservations to a
right contained in a convention weighs against the potentially norm-creating
character of the convention, and the likelihood of the right being transposed into
customary international law. 98 It is therefore pertinent that article 4 of the
ICCPR allows states to derogate from the prohibition on arbitrary detention in
times of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. This may appear
to undermine the contention that the prohibition on arbitrary detention is not
limited to the ICCPR but also exists under customary international law.
However, the Human Rights Committee has determined that while the right may
be derogated from in emergencies, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and
detention is part of customary international law and accordingly a state may not

93.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 107/1981,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981 (1983) [hereinafter Almeida de Quinteros].
94.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], U. N. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, at 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27 (Sept. 30, 1993).
95.
Mitchell, supranote 5, at 442.
96.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Giry v. Dom. Rep., Commc'n No. 193/1985, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/39/D/193/1985 (1990).
97.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, Can6fi Garcia v. Ecuador, Commc'n No. 319/1988, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988 (1991).
98.
North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 71, para. 60-82.
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reserve the possibility of contravening this right.99 The possibility of derogating
from this right in specific circumstances was intended to provide a means
whereby a state may have to resort to extreme measures when the legitimate
control of the state is threatened."° The narrow confines under which article 9
is inapplicable indicates the consensus of states regarding the importance of this
right to individuals. This consensus is widespread, with 152 states currently
party to the ICCPR, and another eight states being signatories.''
While the decisions of the Human Rights Committee attempt to infer the
existence of a customary norm prohibiting extraterritorial abduction, it is
arguable that by themselves they do no more than emphasize the ICCPR
prohibition on extraterritorial abduction. However, the extensive recognition
of the rights contained in the Covenant, the fact that Covenant is most certainly
of a norm-creating character, and the steadfast position of the Human Rights
Committee regarding the prohibition of extraterritorial abduction is certainly a
starting point towards showing that there is enough uniformity amongst states
to substantiate a claim that the right to be free from extraterritorial abduction has
crystallized as customary international law.
The Supreme Court did not seem particularly swayed by the rights afforded
by the ICCPR. Although the ICCPR had not been ratified by the United States
at the time of Alvarez's abduction," 2 it was inforce when the Supreme Court
had to consider his suit based on the violation of customary international law.
The Court placed great weight on the Senate's decision not to make the
Covenant directly enforceable in domestic law, stating that "Several times,
indeed, the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of
interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when its ratification
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the
substantive provisions of the document were not self-executing. ' ' Such an
assertion is to drastically misread the extent of the non-self-executing
declaration and the relationship between the ICCPR and customary international
law.

99.
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating
to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or
in Relation toDeclarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, para. 9, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.6
(November 4, 1994) [hereinafter Issues Relating to Reservations].
100.
101.

Id.para. 10.
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF

RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, (2005).

102.

Alvarez was abducted on April 2, 1990. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 609. The International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entered into force for the United States on September 8, 1992.
I.C.C.P.R., supra note 88.
103. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2763.
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Under the Constitution of the United States a treaty is as much a part of
domestic law as an Act passed by the legislature." ° However, by attaching a
non-self-executing declaration to the ratified treaty the legislature can either
remove the standing of any individual to bring a claim under the treaty, remove
the right of any individual to rely on the treaty in any form, or deny the
existence of a cause of action in the absence of other incorporating legislation. °5
When the Senate ratified the ICCPR, a non-self-executing declaration was
attached with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accentuating that its
"intent is to 0clarify
that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in
6
US courts.'
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court used the legislative desire that
causes of action should not be directly founded on the ICCPR to dismiss any
relevance that the ICCPR may have in creating customary international law.
The implication of this approach is that Justice Souter viewed the non-selfexecuting declaration as taking precedence over the content of customary
international law. The ICJ has declared that there are "no grounds for holding
that when customary international law is comprised of rules identical to those
of treaty law, the latter 'supervenes' the former, so that the customary international law has no further existence of its own."' 7 However, it appears that
this is precisely the basis of the Supreme Court's approach to examining the
ICCPR: the Court used the fact that the prohibition on arbitrary detention under
ICCPR was not directly enforceable in domestic law to undermine the
applicability of the same right being enforceable through customary international law.' The Court placed too much weight on the status of the ICCPR
under United States law rather than examining international practice concerning
such rights. Alvarez was not seeking to create a cause of action based on the
ICCPR, but merely claiming that multilateral instruments such as the ICCPR
directly inform the content of customary international law.
Furthermore, the extent to which the ICCPR is self-executing in the
domestic law of the United States is irrelevant as the ATS incorporates the "law
of nations." The Court should have recognized the role that multilateral

104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
105. Chrissy Fox, Implications of the United States' Reservations and Non-Self-Executing
Declarationto the ICCPRfor CapitalOffenders and ForeignRelations, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 303,309

(2003).
106. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Jan. 30, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 645, 657 [hereinafter Senate Committee on Foreign Relations].
107.

Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 95-99.

108. Indeed Sosa submitted that when the Court came to examine the content of customary
international law it could not take into account any treaty or international instrument that the United States
had not ratified as to do otherwise would compromise separation of powers principles. Brief of Petitioner,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339).
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conventions, such as the ICCPR, have in formulating customary international
law and examined whether state practice and jurisprudence based on the rights
under the Convention had developed into a binding international norm
prohibiting abduction and arbitrary detention. Given the influence that the
ICCPR has on the formation of customary international law and the fact that the
United States is a party to the Convention, it is remarkable that the United States
Supreme Court viewed itself as being prevented from "interpreting and
applying" the ICCPR. 1°9 The Court's refusal to give adequate weight to the
rights contained within the ICCPR essentially negates the principle purpose of
the Covenant, which is to protect individuals from their own government.
3. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights"' (European Convention) is
another international instrument that has been invoked to protect the rights of
individuals who have been forcibly abducted from another state in order to face
prosecution. Although the Convention has obvious geographical limitations as
to the countries that it binds, it is yet another indication of a collective
recognition of the right not to be subjected to arbitrary detention. Article 5(1)
guarantees individuals the right to "liberty and security of person." Although
the language of "arbitrary detention" contained in the ICCPR is not used,
Article 5 requires all deprivations of liberty to be prescribed by law and to fall
within the exhaustive list of possible justifications for detention. European
institutions have had several opportunities to examine cases of extraterritorial
abduction and these cases contribute to the understanding of the right to be free
from state-sponsored abductions under customary international law.
In Bozano v. France,"' after a failed extradition application to transfer an
individual from France to Italy, the individual was abducted by French
policemen and was forcibly taken into Switzerland, where he was subsequently
extradited to Italy. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld the
applicant's complaint, concluding that the transfer by French authorities was a
disguised form of extradition designed to circumvent an earlier unfavorable
decision."' The refusal of the police to follow the domestic laws of France
rendered the abduction unlawful and in breach of article 5(1) of the Covenant.
Furthermore, the Court held that any measure depriving an individual of liberty
must be compatible with the purposes of article 5, which is to protect an

109.
110.

Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2763.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms].
111.
112.

Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 297 (1986).
Idat317.
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individual from arbitrariness." 3 This purposive approach meant that the Court
was not solely limited to considering the legality ofthe detention, but could also
take into account the entire context of the abduction, detention, the effect of the
abduction on the applicant, and deliberateness with which French officials
violated the law. The willingness of the Court to examine all the circumstances
surrounding the abduction, rather than solely focusing on the legality of the
detention as required by a literal reading of article 5(1), illustrates a recognition
of the serious implications that an abduction may have on an individual's
interests.
The European Commission on Human Rights was more explicit in its
condemnation of abductions being contrary to article 5(1) in Stock6 v.
Germany."4' The applicant alleged that he had been brought into Germany
against his will by a private citizen in collusion with the German police. The
claim was dismissed as unproven, although the Commission held that if German
officials had arranged the abduction then "the Commission considers that such
circumstances may render this person's arrest and detention unlawful within the
meaning of article 5(1) of the Convention."'"
Despite the indications that the European Convention provided individuals
with a robust right not to be forcibly abducted by states, this right is not
independent from the rights of the individual's state. In both Mlich Sanchez
Ramirez v. France1 6 and Ocalan v. Turkey"I7 it was held that consent on the part
of the host-state meant that there was no unlawful detention under article 5. The
ECHR noted that because the European Convention contains no provisions on
extradition procedure, all that is required for a rendition to be consistent with the
Convention is a legal basis for the transfer (such as an arrest warrant issued by
the state of origin) and co-operation on the part of the host-state."' It is truly
remarkable that an individual's right to liberty under the Convention, a
Convention created solely to protect individuals, is entirely dependant on
whether a state complains that its sovereignty has been violated. While this
aspect may undermine the significance given to an individual's right to liberty,
it is important to note that the ECHR held that the abduction of an individual in
violation of a state's sovereignty breaches the right to liberty under article
5(l)."' While not going as far as it could to uphold human rights, such a view
reaffirms the international endorsement of the right to be free from forcible
transnational abduction.
113. Id.
114. Stocke v. Germany, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 839 (1991).
115.

Id.at852.

116. Illich Sanchez Ramirez v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., application no. 28780/95 (1996).
117. Ocalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2003).
118. Id.at273.
119. Id.
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Although the European Court of Human Rights has been unequivocal that
the arrest of an individual by authorities of one state in contravention of another
state's sovereignty involves not only state responsibility vis-A-vis the other state,
but also violates an individual's right to security under article 5(1),120 the
Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was unmoved. Neither the
European Covenant nor the decisions on the issue of abduction were even
canvassed by the judgment for the majority. For the Court to conclude that
there was no evidence to suggest the existence of customary rule prohibiting
arbitrary detention12 without examining the substantial European jurisprudence
on the matter is an oversight. The Court's fixated analysis on the generality
surrounding the alleged right to arbitrary detention ignores the more specific
right that has been recognized under the ICCPR and the European Convention:
that individuals have a right to be free from an extraterritorial abduction
conducted in violation of the sovereignty of another state. Although the
European Covenant does not create customary international law, when taken in
conjunction with other international instruments and state practice it is apparent
that there is a global repudiation of the use of extraterritorial abduction.
D. The Approach ofDomestic Courts

Despite the evidence of an international consensus that individuals have a
right to be free from being forcibly abducted and transferred to another state,
there are occasions when domestic courts will proceed with the prosecution of
the individual regardless of any breach of their rights. The often-followed
decision by the United States Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois held that courts
could exercise jurisdiction over an individual regardless of the unlawful manner
in which an individual may be made to appear before the Court.'
This
principle stems from the Roman maxim "mala captus bene detentus": improperly captured, properly detained.' 23 The doctrine has been rigorously enforced
by courts in the United States,'24 while at the same time being vociferously
criticized by academics as endorsing the Executive's violations of international
law. 125
However, decisions that an individual should be prosecuted following an
abduction are not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a right to be free
120.
121.

Mitchell, supra note 5, at 429.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2768.

122.

Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).

123.

Rudy, supra note 66, at 802.

124. See e.g. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); United States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655.
125. See e.g. Jonathan Bush, How Did We Get Here? ForeignAbduction After Alvarez-Machain,45
STAN. L. R. 939 (1993); Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdictionin Seizures Effected in Violation of linternational

Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INTrL L. 265 (1952); Wilske, supranote 5.
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from extraterritorial abduction. In such situations, the courts were not concerned with the existence of a human right prohibiting transnational abductions,
but rather whether a breach of the alleged right would require proceedings to be
dismissed and the individual to be repatriated. Indeed, in many of these cases,
the courts avoided examining whether there is such a right by deeming it
irrelevant given that a breach of international law is a matter for the Executive
to remedy. 6 The refusal of United States courts to decline jurisdiction over
transnational abductees is relevant to the scope of remedies available to
abductees rather than a rejection of the right to be free from extraterritorial
abduction. The existence of a customary norm protecting individuals from
extraterritorial abduction and a possible norm providing a remedy for a breach
of such a right are two separate issues.
Although courts have traditionally refused to examine the circumstances
of the arrest and detention of an abductee, there has been much progress in the
recognition of due process and human rights since the Ker v. Illinois decision
of 1886. The narrow conception of due process as only being concerned with
whether the accused has a fair trial now expands to situations where official pretrial misconduct can result in evidence being excluded. 2 7 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in US. v. Toscanino'28 recognized that the
exclusion of evidence was not an end in itself, but was a means to give effect to
the principles of due process and to ensure that the government should not be
able to benefit from its illegal conduct. 29 The proceedings against Toscanino,
who was abducted and tortured while in custody, were dismissed. There, the
Court gave particular weight to the need to uphold constitutional norms, which
were influenced by international human rights law.' However, the effect of
this case in advancing human rights law is minimal, as the decision has been
interpreted as only applying where the individual is treated inhumanely while
in custody.'3 '
The greatest challenge to the traditional view that courts should not
concern themselves with the means by which an abductee may be brought
before them comes from South Africa in State v. Ebrahim32 and from the
United Kingdom in Bennett v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court and
another. 3 In Ebrahim, the Court established a link between the sound
126. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669 (holding that "the decision of whether respondent should
be returned to Mexico.. .is a matter for the Executive Branch").
127.

Mitchell, supranote 55, at 400.

128.
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Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
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administration of justice and the fundamental principles of the promotion of
human rights and friendly international relations.'
After an analysis of the
influence of international human rights norms on domestic law the Court
dismissed proceedings and Ebrahim was subsequently able to claim damages for
his unlawful abduction and detention. 3 In Bennett, the House of Lords determined that courts had the authority to examine the circumstances surrounding
the abduction of Bennett to face charges in England and that to allow criminal
proceedings to continue in such a situation would be an abuse of process. While
the individual judgments illustrate a myriad of factors that each judge used
when concluding an abuse of power by the Executive existed, Lord Griffiths
indicated that the Law Lords have a responsibility "to oversee executive action
and to refuse to countenance behavior that threatens either basic human rights
'
or the rule of law."136
Lord Lowry rejected the Supreme Court's approach in
Ker v. Illinois, holding that the question should not be whether a court has
jurisdiction to try an individual, but whether such jurisdiction should be
exercised in light of the violation of rights under international law.' 37
Although the courts in Ebrahim and Bennett did not examine whether
individuals had explicit right to be free from extraterritorial abduction, the
highest courts in South Africa and the United Kingdom both used the general
principles of international human rights law to conclude that the prosecution of
an abductee would violate domestic standards of due process. However, the
reluctance of many domestic courts (particularly in the United States) to
recognize and apply international human rights law in such situations is
concerning. The contention that courts need not concern themselves with the
rights of the individual prior to trial is an archaic notion that has no place in a
global community that is founded upon respect for human rights.'38
The approach of domestic courts to cases can influence the content of
customary international law by shaping state practice and indicating the
presence of a customary norm. However, the approach of domestic courts to
cases concerning extraterritorial abduction is a neutral factor in the analysis of
customary international human rights law on the topic. Although the vast
majority of prosecutions stemming from the abduction of an individual have
been upheld as valid, it is important to appreciate that such judicial decisions do
not undermine the existence of an individual right to be free from extraterritorial
abduction. The decisions merely indicate that if such a right exists it is unlikely
ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNUAL REVIEW].

134.
135.
136.

Ebrahim,95 I.L.R. at 442.
Id. at417.
Regina v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. (Ex parte Bennett), [1994] 1 A.C. 42, 62 (Eng. H.L. 1993).
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that the remedy of a stay of prosecution has also entered into customary
international law. Such a view has come about through the flawed belief that
the judiciary has no role to play in providing a remedy to an individual
subsequent to a violation of international law.'39 Although there is some
indication through South African and United Kingdom jurisprudence that the
human rights of an abductee are becoming increasingly relevant before domestic
courts, there is not enough uniform practice throughout the world to conclude
that the approach of the judiciary in such cases either contributes to or
contradicts the existence of a customary norm protecting an individual from
extraterritorial abduction.
E. Resolving the Issue: Is There a Customary Norm?
State practice concerning the abduction of individuals in order to bring
them before domestic courts will never be completely uniform. States are
inherently self-interested and are reluctant to ascribe to a norm that may limit
their ability to conduct self-help operations in the future. "° In the absence of
an enforcement mechanism for international law, states may often decide that
the benefits of breaching international law outweigh the costs. Therefore, it is
important that state actions that appear to be contrary to an alleged customary
norm are not automatically assumed to be evidence of the absence of the norm.
Inconsistent state practice could instead illustrate that the state concerned is a
persistent objector and that the state is not bound by the norm, or the state is
breaching an international norm that is otherwise adhered to.
The relevant test for examining inconsistent state actions was offered by
the ICJ in Nicaraguav. United States, which emphasized that there is no need
for state practice to be in rigorous conformity with the rnle. 4' The Court went
on to comment that:
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems

it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent
with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with
a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that

rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. 142

139. See Costi, supra note 5, at 95-97 (discussing how the judiciary can invoke the international
responsibility of the state by ignoring an infringement of international law).
140. JOHN BAYLIS & STEVE SMITH, THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 117 (1997).

141.
142.

Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 95-99.
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It is evident that state-sponsored abductions are certainly not seen as the
recognition of a new rule of international law, but are typically universally
condemned as infringing customary international human rights law.
The abduction ofAlvarez-Machain by the United States and the subsequent
decision by the Supreme Court in 1992 received international condemnation.
The Canadian government stated that it would not tolerate such abductions from
its soil, while the Argentine President derided the court decision "a horror."' 43
As well as the abduction receiving widespread criticism from states, there was
near universal criticism from non-governmental organizations, lawyers and
academics. Furthermore the Inter-American Juridical Committee condemned
the attitude of the United States Government as violating fundamental rules and
principles of international law.'" Such criticism is comparable to that of Israel
following the abduction of Eichmann, where disapproval by individual states
was supported by a Security Council resolution decrying the breach of
international law.'45
When the United States has conducted extraterritorial operations to seize
suspected criminals, it has always attempted to tone down the implications that
such conduct could have for international law. Following the abduction of
Alvarez-Machain, a State Department Spokesman said that the Supreme Court
decision did "not represent a 'green light' for future abductions," and that only
in "extreme cases" would kidnapping be justified.' 6 Concern that foreign states
might undertake extraterritorial law enforcement operations in the United States
also led to a State Department lawyer resisting the contention that abductions
were consistent with international law. 47 The view that transnational abductions are inconsistent with customary international law is further supported by
a 1989 memorandum to the Attorney General outlining the President's authority
to breach customary international law by ordering the abduction of an individual
from a foreign country. 4 ' By arguing that transnational abductions are the
exception rather than the norm the United States is fulfilling the test established
143.
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in the Nicaragua case: the conduct is typically viewed as breaching a rule rather
than creating a new rule.
While the international denunciation of forcible abductions will often focus
on any breach of state sovereignty, there is sufficient state practice and opinio
juris to suggest that a customary norm exists whereby the human rights of an
individual require states to refrain from extraterritorial abduction. Cumulatively, the decisions by the Human Rights Committee and the European Court
of Human Rights, the recognition of international human rights instruments, and
the practice of states provide enough evidence of consistent state practice and
opinio juris to establish a customary norm protecting individuals from extraterritorial abduction.
The right to be free from abduction exists independently of whether there
is also a breach of the host-state's sovereignty. To make a breach of an
individual's rights dependant on there first being a breach of state sovereignty
is to effectively limit the scope of the right to being no more than a derivative
of a state's right to territorial inviolability. If the prohibition of arbitrary
detention is to be an effective human right it must also be available to protect
an individual in situations where the host-state consents to their abduction. This
approach is endorsed by Harry Blackmun, a dissenting Supreme Court Justice
in UnitedStates v. Alvarez-Machain, who commented, "even with the consent

of the foreign sovereign, kidnapping a foreign national flagrantly violates
peremptory human rights norms."' 4 9 Such a view recognizes that the rights of

an abducted individual will be affected in the same manner whether the hoststate is complicit in the abduction or not.
F. The Implicationsof a Breach of This Right

When states breach international law there are legal consequences (which
may include reparation, compensation, and/or apologies) that flow from the
wrongful action. 5 ' The Permanent Court of International Justice upheld the
principles of state responsibility by stating that "the essential principle ...

is

that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have
15
existed if that act had not been committed.' '
For an individual who has been forcibly removed to another jurisdiction
to stand trial, the most desirable form of reparation would be for the criminal
proceedings to be dismissed and to be repatriated. It is widely recognized that
when an abduction breaches a state's sovereignty and the protesting state
149.
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demands the return of the individual then the first duty on the abducting state
is to return the individual. 5 2 However, this remedy is one that is owed by one
state to another and would not be applicable in the absence of a formal protest
from the host-state. The issue of the responsibility of states towards individuals
for breaches of international law is more uncertain,'53 and for this reason was
not incorporated by the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility.'54 Unlike international human rights conventions, which tend
to explicitly require a state to provide an effective remedy to an individual
whose rights have been breached,' 55 there is as yet no recognition of a binding
requirement on states to provide individuals with a specific remedy when their
human rights are breached.
Due to the uncertain content of international law regarding the remedies
that states owe to individuals, the ability of abductees to have a remedy for a
breach of their rights under customary international law is dependant on the
extent of each state's reception of international law into the domestic legal
system. 5 6 The status of international law in domestic law varies greatly, and
each legal system will have a slightly different view as to whether domestic
courts have a duty to allow individuals to enforce a right that exists at an
international level. It is outside the scope of this paper to conduct an exhaustive
inquiry into the trends relating to the status of international law in domestic
legal systems, but it is pertinent to note that the failure of courts to uphold
international law can invoke the international responsibility of the state. The
conduct of domestic courts are regarded under international law as being
attributable to the state,'57 and so a judicial infringement of an individual's
international rights can make the state responsible for remedying the breach.

152. OPPENHEIM, supranote 4, at 295.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
432; BASSIOuNI, supra note 3, at 290.
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However, domestic courts cannot be said to be violating an individual's
rights simply by allowing the prosecution of an abductee. Therefore, the key
issue is whether domestic courts are under an international obligation to remedy
the Executive's breach of international law by refusing to prosecute an
abductee. While it may be desirable for domestic courts to refuse to endorse a
state's violation of its human rights obligations, there is no international
obligation on domestic courts to decline jurisdiction over an abductee. The
prevalence of the rule of "male captus bene detentus" throughout the world,
while controversial, is clear evidence of the non-existence of any norm requiring
states to decline the prosecution of abductees. It is therefore apparent that the
existence in customary international law of an individual right to be free from
extraterritorial abduction is not supplemented by any such norm requiring
domestic courts to divest themselves of hearing the case.
While it may be premature to claim that there is a customary rule
compelling courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over abductees, it is not
accurate to claim that the violation of an individual's internationally guaranteed
rights is irrelevant to a court's consideration whether or not to exercise jurisdiction.'58 As evidenced by the decisions of Ebrahim and Bennett, where domestic
courts declined to exercise jurisdiction, the human rights of an individual can
be used in a domestic context. These two cases provide important examples
whereby courts were able to use international legal principles to interpret the
domestic expectations of due process. Such decisions should be applauded as
not only giving effect to an individual's rights, but also acting as a deterrent to
future violations of international law.' 59 Only by declining to exercise
jurisdiction can domestic courts maintain the integrity of international human
rights and encourage states to abide by their international legal obligations.
Unfortunately for the subjects of an extraterritorial abduction, given that
international law does not mandate that domestic courts must refuse to exercise
jurisdiction over abductees, there will be occasions when they are not provided
with an effective domestic remedy. The only other traditional remedies,
compensation and an apology, are unlikely to resolve the problem for abductees
that they are now within the jurisdiction of a state that is determined to
prosecute them. However, it would be a misconception to consequently view
158.
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the right to be free from extraterritorial abduction as little more than an "empty
right." The right of individuals to be free from state-sponsored abductions,
similar to much of international law, must derive a great deal of the force from
its prescriptive nature rather than the presence of an enforcement mechanism.
Not only does the right carry much moral force, but it can be viewed as an
important step towards the formation of an individual right not to be prosecuted
following the unlawful transfer from another state.' 60
VI. THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION AND
SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN

A. Reconciling the Supreme Court'sDecision with the CustomaryNorm

While there will always be difficulties for an individual seeking a domestic
remedy for a breach of their international rights, such difficulties were compounded in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain by the refusal of the Supreme Court to
recognize the existence of the individual right. The Court's flawed analysis of
customary international law not only means that individuals abducted by the
United States will be unable to receive compensation for their treatment under
the ATS, but more importantly, it reduces the possibility of an abductee having
the prosecution against them dismissed. In the absence of a breach of
sovereignty and an accompanying complaint by the host-state, the ability of an
abductee to avoid prosecution depends upon the extent to which domestic courts
will recognize the breach of their rights. Although United States courts have
traditionally been reluctant to dismiss proceedings for a violation of international law, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain should
not be adopted uncritically by courts as the basis for denying the existence of
an internationally accepted right of individuals to be free from extraterritorial
abduction.
While the Supreme Court concluded that Alvarez could not cite sufficient
evidence to support the contention that international law recognizes a norm
prohibiting the use of arbitrary detention, the Court then retreated from this
position slightly, holding that any "credible invocation" of a principle against
arbitrary detention requires more than a relatively brief detention.61 The Court
indicated that for any such claim to be successful the detention must be
"prolonged,"' 62 and that the alleged norm was therefore not applicable to
Alvarez who had been transferred into the custody of lawful authorities within

160. See Costi, supra note 5, at 95-99 (analyzing how the right to be free from extraterritorial
abduction could lead to the development of a right against prosecution).
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a day of being abducted. 63 Such a concession by the Court is not an attempt to
indicate that there are occasions where extraterritorial abductions may violate
customary international law, but is an attempt by the Court to take into account
the respected Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(the Restatement).'
The Restatement asserts that "[a] state violates international law if, as a
matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones ...prolonged
arbitrary detention.' 65 The Restatement acknowledges that many United States
courts have recognized that any form of arbitrary detention is prohibited by
customary international law,'" but does not provide any evidence as to why an
arbitrary detention must be "prolonged."
This distinction made by the
Restatement has been labeled as "curious" and has been criticized as diverging
from the right recognized by international treaties, state practice and domestic
67
courts. 1

By taking the Restatement as being the defimitive authority on the content
of customary international law, the Supreme Court was able to dismiss the
seriousness of Alvarez's detention by only concerning itself with the duration
of Alvarez's detention. Although the irregular detention of individuals is
concerning, it is the fact that individuals are being transferred between countries
through an extra-legal process that is more disturbing. Rather than exclusively
focusing on the length of time that an individual was arbitrarily detained, the
interest of the Court should have been on what happened during that period.
Not only will most abductions violate the domestic law of the host-state, but the
removal of abductees from the control of the host-state deprives abductees of
the ability to invoke the protection of procedural safeguards that would typically
be available through any extradition process. Until abductees are brought
before a court to hear the charges against them, their fate is effectively in the
hands of the abductors. Abductees are likely to be subjected to various forms
of physical abuse, they might be drugged, they might not be brought before a
judge in an expeditious manner, they might be interrogated in the absence of a
lawyer, and they might also be unable to ascertain who has abducted them and
68
why. 1
The Supreme Court's contention that if customary international law
prohibits arbitrary detention it does so only to the extent that such detention is
prolonged, is accordingly unsound. However, this position did allow the Court
163.

Id at 2769.
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to dismiss any international precedent that supported Alvarez's position.
Although the ICJ had indicated in The Hostages Case that arbitrary detention
violated fundamental principles of international law, the Supreme Court
dismissed the attempt by Alvarez to invoke the same principles, holding that
"the detention in that case was... far longer and harsher than Alvarez's."' 69 If
such a requirement for prolonged detention did exist it would provide little
protection for individuals and could be viewed by states as permitting unlawful
detentions as long as they were not lengthy. Only by focusing on the motives
behind a state's actions and the overall effect of the detention on the individual
can human rights law effectively provide an individual with protection against
wrongful state actions.
A human rights inquiry into extraterritorial abduction should be concerned
with the deliberate attempt by a state to limit the procedural protection available
to an individual. International human rights law recognizes the importance of
procedural protections for individuals and this is the key reason why customary
international law prohibits the use of state-sponsored abduction as a means to
acquire the custody of a suspected criminal. The practice of states provides no
evidence that this human rights norm is entirely dependant upon the length of
time that an individual is denied access to the proper legal process.
The Supreme Court's analysis would have been more convincing if it had
attempted to argue that the United States was a persistent objector to the
creation of an individual right to be free from extraterritorial abduction. The
willingness with which the United States has used abduction as a means to
acquire the custody of suspected criminals would certainly lend weight to an
argument that it does not consider itself bound by any human rights norm that
limits the ability to use abduction in order to seize a suspect. 7 ' However,
Justice Souter for the majority failed to accommodate the persistent objector
rule, and rather than using examples such as the non-self-executing declaration
to the ICCPR as evidence that the United States did not adhere to such norms,
the Court used these examples to deny the existence of the norm. 71
B. Understandingthe Influencing Factorson the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's flawed view of the substance of customary
international law was influenced by a number of important factors that
169.

Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2768.

170. Recent U.S. cases involving the use of extraterritorial abduction include United States v. Lira,
515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. CaroQuintero, 745 F.Supp. 599 (D. Cal. 1990); United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kansi v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.C. Cir.
1998); Yunis, 681 F.Supp. at 896; Noriega, 746 F.Supp. at 1506.
171. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2767.
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encouraged the Court to downplay the rights of an individual in Alvarez's
situation. Understanding the backdrop to the decision will help to explain why
the decision of the Supreme Court conflicts with international recognition of the
individual right to be free from extraterritorial abduction.
The Court's examination of customary international law was almost
certainly unduly influenced by the debate over the ATS. It is an indication that
the facts of Alvarez's abduction were almost incidental to the issues before the
Court that of the forty-nine pages in Sosa's submissions to the Court only two
pages were dedicated to arguing that the respondent did not violate customary
international law.'72

Indeed Alvarez's own lawyer commented after the

173
judgment that "we lost the battle in that case, but won the war on the ATS.'
Given that the 6-3 decision of the Court to not rule out the possibility of new
claims being created in the future under the ATS, the Court was in a position
where it needed to dismiss Alvarez's case to placate critics of the ATS.' 74 Not
only was the bar set very high before any customary international law can
become actionable under the ATS, but the judgment also indicates that there is
a very high threshold before the Court will consider any norm to be considered
customary international law. The Court was overly cautious in its examination
of the whether Alvarez's abduction and detention violated international law for
fear of opening the floodgates to litigation by foreigners. This need to reduce
the number of cases being considered under the ATS has led to an artificially
narrow reading of international law.
Ever since a decision of the Supreme Court in 1938 denied the existence
of a federal common law, 75 federal courts in the United States have been wary
of creating new causes of action. Although the existence of common law would
allow judges to ensure that the law can appropriately take into account
developments in society, for many judges this dynamic feature of the law
threatens to undermine the basis of democracy by allowing courts, rather than
the legislature, to create new law. 76 "Originalist" judges, for which Justice
Scalia is the leading voice, 177 are of the view that to give effect to the true role
of the federal judiciary the law should be viewed as static and that "an
172. Respondent's Brief, supra note 57.
173. Stacey Harms & Samira Puskar, On the Docket: The Court Opens the Door to International
Human Rights Cases,
MEDILL NEWS SERVICE,
June
2004,
available at

http://docket.medill.morthwestem.edu/archives/000991print.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
174. In particular the Bush Administration had been particularly vocal against the permissive
approach of judges in allowing ATS suits. Anthony Sebok, The Alien Tort Claims Act: How Powerful a
Human Rights Weapon Is It?, FIND LAW LEGAL COMMENTARY, June 12, 2004, available at

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer-friendly.pl?page=/sebok20040712.htnl (last visited Oct. 6,2005).
175. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
176.

Richard B. Saphire, Commentaries: Constitutional Predispositions, 23 DAYTON L. REV. 277,

284(1998).
177. Id. at 282.
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authoritative text should be understood as of the time that the text was written
instead of some other time, like the present."'' 8 It is in the framework of this
ideological debate over judicial interpretation that the Supreme Court
considered how the reference to the "law of nations" in the ATS should be
interpreted.
To the consternation of Justice Scalia'79 the majority indicated that the "law
of nations" was a flexible concept that should be able to accommodate changes
in international law. 80 However, while conceding that the content of the law
of nations should not be limited to the international norms existing in 1789, the
Court then adopted an originalist position by maintaining that only those norms
with a specificity comparable to the norms that existed when the ATS was
enacted would be actionable. 8 '
However, the Court then proceeded to conflate the issues of whether the
norm exists under international law and whether a cause of action should be
provided. The majority decision urged "restraint in judicially applying
internationally generated norms,"'82 but it appears that such restraint was also
applied to the recognition of international norms. The Court's reluctance to
give appropriate weight to evidence of international custom was emphasized by
repeatedly stressing, "the law is not so much found or discovered as it is either
made or created."' 83 While this aversion to creating new law is understandable

when the Court is being asked to create a cause of action, it has no place in any
analysis of the substance of customary international law. Customary
international law is not created through judicial recognition, but evolves over
time through consistent state practice.
The approach to interpreting
international law is distinct from the process of applying domestic law.
It is evident that the Court was influenced by the debate over the
appropriate role of judge-made law in the United States and that this issue
unnecessarily affected its analysis of the content of customary international law.
Justice Souter for the majority stated "we have no congressional mandate to
seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations, and
modem indications of congressional understanding of the judicial role in the
field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity. ''""4 The
178. John Harrison, Law and Truth: Panel M." Originalism and Historical Truth: Forms of
Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 89 (2003).

179.
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a cause of action based on international law would be dependant on the discretion ofjudges. Alvarez-Machain,

124 S.Ct. at 2775 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2763.
181. Id.at2761.
182. Id. at 2762.
183. Id.

184. Id.at 2763.
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traditional reluctance of federal courts to create new causes of action has
therefore been transposed to a reluctance to "seek out" new customary
international law. The basis for the theory of originalism is the concern that a
judge who does not stick closely to the text of a statute and the associated
historical context has too much subjectivity in determining the content of the
"'
law. 85
Due to the unwritten nature of customary international law and the
degree of discretion available to courts in recognizing norms based on state
practice, the Supreme Court was accordingly wary of affirming a customary
norm in the absence of Congressional approval.'86 The need for a
"congressional mandate"'

7

in order to affirm the existence of a customary norm

indicates the reluctance of the Court to be bound by international law that the
United States had not explicitly consented to. Such a stance is consistent with
the notion ofjudicial minimalism in lawmaking, but is contrary to the principle
that the existence of customary international law is not dependant on express
state consent. 8 8 It is outside the scope of this paper to comment on the
resistance of federal courts to creating law in the United States, but it is
pertinent to comment that in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain the Court's desire for
legislative guidance as to whether a cause of action should be created certainly
influenced its determination to deny the existence of a customary right to be free
from abduction and detention.
As well as being influenced by theories on the appropriate role of the ATS,
the Supreme Court's analysis of the legality of abducting and detaining an
individual needs to be placed in the context of the current war on terrorism. The
strong dissent in the Court of Appeals argued that by allowing Alvarez's claim
to succeed the majority had "needlessly shackled the efforts of our political
branches in dealing with complex and sensitive issues of national security." '89
The fear of restricting the Executive's conduct in foreign affairs certainly
influenced the Supreme Court to relegate the importance of human rights in
relation to national policy. The Court specifically noted that courts would have
to be aware of any "collateral consequences" that a decision under the ATS may
have on the Executive's exercise of discretion in foreign affairs.'"o
The Court was not only circumspect about unduly limiting the ability of the
Executive to use extraterritorial abduction in the war on terrorism, but it also
had to consider the implications of its own recent decisions. On the day prior
to the judgment in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain being released, the Supreme Court
185.
186.
jurisdiction."
187.
188.
189.
190.

Saphire, supra note 176, at 285.
Indeed the Court indicated that it "would welcome any congressional guidance in exercising
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2765.
Id.
at 2763.
ILA, supra note 70, at 38.
Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 658-59 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. at 2763.
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released several high-profile decisions concerning the rights of those that the
Executive had detained in the war on terror. When viewing these cases together
it becomes apparent that any other decision by the Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain would have serious implications for the United States government.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that a United States citizen seeking
to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
basis for his classification and be granted a fair opportunity to rebut the
government's assertions before a neutral decision maker. 9' Justice O'Connor
emphasized that "history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system
of detention carries the potential to become a means of oppression and abuse of
others who do not present that sort of threat.'

192

The importance of individuals

being able to challenge their detention was also emphasized in Rasul v. Bush
where foreigners being held at Guantanamo Bay were granted the right to test
the legality of their detention before federal courts. 93 While these two decisions
can be seen as upholding international law by limiting the right of a government
to indefinitely detain individuals without access to courts, why then did the
Court seemingly counter this the very next day by holding that there was no
right under international law to be free from arbitrary detention?
A primary policy reason for the approach of the Supreme Court stems from
the implications of allowing hundreds of individuals detained by the United
States military to challenge their detention: domestic courts would be required
to rule whether an individual's continued detention is justified or whether an
individual is being arbitrarily detained. A conclusion that an individual's
detention is unwarranted and arbitrary could therefore not only lead to that
individual's release but also to the possibility of civil claims being initiated
under the ATS. This concerned the minority in the Court of Appeals,"94 and
would have also influenced the Supreme Court's decision to read-down the
status of international law on the issue of arbitrary detention of transnational
abductees.
The decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machainhas to be read in conjunction with
these earlier decisions. Although the Court took a stand against the government
by allowing Guantanamo detainees to challenge their detention, the decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain duly limited the repercussions for the government. A
decision that an arbitrary detention could lead to civil damages would have
191.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

192. Id.at 2657.
193.

Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004).

194. Judge O'Scannlain noted that, "the majority has left the door open for the objects of our
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dramatically undermined the current Administration's treatment of terrorist
suspects and the Court may have been seen as encouraging the detainees to
bring suits the day after allowing them to challenge their detentions. The
importance of limiting the ability of individuals detained in the Government's
war on terrorism to file civil suits was underscored by the fact that the
government required Yaser Hamdi to waive any right to sue the United States
over his captivity before releasing him.'95
The Supreme Court's inadequate analysis of customary international law
protecting individuals from state-sponsored abductions can only be understood
in light of the cumulative effect that the aforementioned factors had on the
Court. Concerns over judicial law-making, the need to limit the scope of the
ATS, the desire not to restrict the Executive's actions, and the possible
implications that any contrary decision would have for the detainees of the
United States in the war on terrorism compounded the Court's reluctance to
consider itself bound by an international norm that the United States had not
expressly consented to be bound by. These considerations all contributed to the
Court's decision to read-down customary international law and not to recognize
right of individuals not to be subjected to extraterritorial abduction.
VII. CONCLUSION

Over the last sixty years the international legal system has aimed to ensure
peace and security through inter-state co-operation and by encouraging respect
for human rights.' 96 Extradition procedures provide a means for respecting state
boundaries and ensuring procedural safeguards for individuals, while also
combating the impunity of offenders that occurs when a suspect resides outside
a state that is seeking their protection. However, extradition is not a feasible
option when the host-state is unwilling or unable to co-operate. In such
situations states may resort to extra-legal methods in order to facilitate the
prosecution of suspects. The abduction, detention and forcible transfer of
individuals by state authorities challenges the foundation of the international
legal system by disregarding principles of state sovereignty and human rights.
In the absence of consent by the host-state, any attempt by the prosecuting
state to acquire custody of the suspect by conducting operations within the hoststate's territory violates international law. While such abductions are widely
recognized as breaching international law protecting the territorial integrity of

195.
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the state,197 they also breach the right of an individual to be free from
extraterritorial abduction. The basis of this right stems from the absence of
procedural protections available to an abductee and the deliberate attempt by the
abducting state to disregard the procedural safeguards available to the individual
under the domestic law of the host state. This individual right exists
independently from a breach of a state's sovereignty and can therefore be
invoked by an individual in situations when the host-state is complicit in the
abduction. The right of individuals not to be subjected to state-sponsored
abductions has clearly evolved through state practice under the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the
European Convention on Human Rights. These international instruments have
helped to provide sufficiently uniform state practice and opinio juris for the
right to become universally binding under customary international law.
Yet, when the United States Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
recently had an opportunity to affirm the existence of this norm, it declared that
there was scant evidence that the alleged norm was part of customary
international law.'98 This paper has demonstrated that the Court was motivated
by a need to restrict future claims under the ATS, was hesitant to recognize the
existence of a customary international law norm without legislative direction,
was influenced by the reluctance of the United States to adhere to the norm, and
was wary of the effect that any contrary decision could have on the ability of the
Executive in the war on terrorism.
These considerations, which are irrelevant to determining the content of
customary international law, prompted the Court to reach a conclusion that
unnecessarily relegates the importance of human rights norms. The implication
of denying the existence of an international right protecting individuals from
being abducted and detained by states is that abductees would be dependant
upon the willingness of a state to advance a claim on their behalf. Such an
outcome is unappealing. The recognition of the right of individuals to be free
from extraterritorial abduction is consistent with the development of human
rights law over the last sixty years and the increasing recognition of individuals
as distinct actors in the international legal system.

197.
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